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This article studies the way in which the crimes of the communist 
regime have been dealt with since the late Soviet period, and the way 
the legacies of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and 
the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) have been subject to reevaluation. 
During the Soviet period, policies such as the rehabilitation of victims 
of mass repression were initiated from above, while the documenta-
tion of human rights violations and revelations of mass repressions 
and death by hunger were undertaken by the dissident movement from 
below. Since the late perestroika period, the focus on the crimes of the 
communist regime has been used by the opposition in Ukraine in the 
struggle for the restitution of group rights. Affirmative action concern-
ing the Ukrainian language, culture and history was seen as the restora-
tion of historical justice. This resulted most recently in the adoption of 
so-called ‘decommunization’ laws, which has been a controversial and 
contested issue in Ukraine. The article discusses the factors that shaped 
the way Ukraine has handled the communist past and constructed new 
narratives, and reflects on the reason why a ‘politics of regret’ has not 
resonated yet with political actors involved in the state legitimization 
struggle.
Keywords: communist past, conflict, OUN, politics of history and 
memory, transitional justice, Ukraine, UPA
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Introduction1
Two decades after the fall of the Soviet Union, Myroslav Marynovych, 
a former Ukrainian political prisoner and dissident, observed that 
post-Soviet societies failed to acknowledge, investigate, condemn and 
repent for the crimes of the Stalinist regime, thus inhibiting their further 
progress. He noted the persistence of communist falsifications of his-
tory and memories which as ‘the toga of “a winner over Hitler” cover 
the ugly nakedness of the Stalinist regime, the crimes of which were 
not smaller than the crimes of the Hitler regime’. Marynovych called 
for a trial of communist crimes, the identification of perpetrators and 
acknowledgement of common guilt by all people who ‘worshiped the 
communist animal’. In case of Russia this applied also to repentance for 
the use of communist doctrine to pursue its imperial ambitions.2
A long and complex process of dealing with past injustices started 
in the 1950s with a de-Stalinization policy involving party-controlled 
restitution measures from above: the partial rehabilitation of victims of 
Stalinist repression and the consideration of ‘blank spots’ of history. A 
dissident movement that emerged in Soviet Ukraine in the 1960s and 
1970s focused on the documentation of testimonies of political prison-
ers and the crimes of the communist regime. During the late perestroika 
period (1988–1991), part of the Communist Party nomenklatura and the 
dissident movement coalesced around a common agenda acknowledg-
ing past injustices and the need for restitution and affirmative action to 
redress past grievances.
The communist regime in Ukraine seems to have received its definite 
trial after the Euromaidan protests in 2013–4. The Ukrainian parliament 
adopted the four so called ‘decommunization’ laws on 9 April 2015,3 
one of which condemned the communist and Nazi totalitarian regimes 
and prohibited propaganda of their symbols. The main justification 
of the law was that the regimes murdered between 14 to 16  million 
 people in Ukraine, and that the Ukrainian state wished to dissociate 
itself from any totalitarian practices. Furthermore, the law was legiti-
mized by security considerations in the context of the ongoing conflict 
in Eastern Ukraine. The lead author of the laws and the new head of the 
Ukrainian Institute of National Memory (UINM) appointed during the 
post-Euromaidan period, Volodymyr Vyatrovych, justified the laws in 
the following way:
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The persistent totalitarian past still impedes the development of Ukraine 
into a European democratic state, because Putin’s aggression against 
Ukraine relies on the islands of ‘Sovietness’, which due to historical cir-
cumstances are mostly left in the Donbas and Crimea. These are mainly the 
persons who have Soviet values (not the Russians or Russian speakers as 
claimed by the Russian propaganda) who currently staff terrorist groups in 
the so-called LNR and DNR. So, the question of the decommunization of 
Ukraine today is a matter of not only cultural policy, but also of security 
policy.4
When reflecting on the results of the decommunization laws one year 
later, President Petro Poroshenko highlighted their security and repara-
tive function: ‘We have to complete decommunization because it is a 
matter of Ukrainian national security. It is also our responsibility for the 
future and a moral duty to the millions and millions of Ukrainians exter-
minated by Bolshevism’.5 Finally, the laws were justified by the earlier 
decommunization experiences of Central and Eastern European states, 
as well as the emerging European and international norms related to the 
condemnation of totalitarian regimes and the need to deal with human 
rights violations committed by them.
Together with the law condemning the communist totalitarian regime, 
another law in the package of the four decommunization laws defined the 
officially-approved genealogy of Ukrainian statehood. It affirmed the com-
memoration of the national liberation movement considered central in the 
attainment of national statehood, and made it illegal to deny the legitimacy 
of ‘the struggle for the independence of Ukraine in the twentieth century’.6 
The law unambiguously excluded the period of Soviet Ukrainian statehood 
from the Ukrainian state-building process. One of the most controversial 
components in the struggle for independence has been the re-evaluation 
of the legacy of the nationalist organizations OUN (the Organization of 
Ukrainian Nationalists) and UPA (the Ukrainian Insurgent Army). These 
had emerged in interwar Poland and then in Nazi-occupied Western 
Ukraine, with the purpose of fighting for an independent Ukrainian state.
About seventy foreign and Ukrainian scholars sent an open letter to 
the President of Ukraine and the Chairman of the Ukrainian parliament 
asking not to sign the draft laws in April 2015. They considered most 
problematic the inclusion of groups such as the OUN and UPA as ‘fight-
ers for Ukrainian independence’:
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Not only would it be a crime to question the legitimacy of an organiza-
tion (UPA) that slaughtered tens of thousands of Poles in one of the most 
heinous acts of ethnic cleansing in the history of Ukraine, but also it would 
exempt from criticism the OUN, one of the most extreme political groups 
in Western Ukraine between the wars, and one which collaborated with 
Nazi Germany at the outset of the Soviet invasion in 1941.7
The link between the crimes of the communist regime and the 
 re-evaluation of legacies of these extreme nationalist organizations as 
part of ‘recovery history’ had already been made by the Ukrainian dis-
sident movement in the 1970s. This article studies the way this connec-
tion has evolved since the late Soviet period.
In what follows, I will examine the factors that have defined the 
ways Eastern European countries have dealt with their communist past, 
such as the relationship between the regime and the opposition during 
the communist and post-communist periods, the regime’s approach to 
ensuring societal compliance and the pre-communist levels of political 
pluralism. I will then consider the role of these factors in shaping the 
politics of transitional justice and memory in Ukraine. Also, I will look 
at the role of different regional levels of legitimacy of Soviet rule in 
Western Ukraine and the rest of Ukraine in the pursuit of transitional 
justice and a politics of memory. Finally, I will discuss the ‘politics of 
regret’, the critical examination of the past combined with a focus on 
the victims on both sides of the conflict, which became the European 
path to post-war reconciliation. In conclusion, I will offer some reflec-
tions on why this has not resonated yet with the parties involved in the 
state legitimization struggle in Ukraine, and reflect on the implications 
of legislation of history for conflict transformation and reconciliation.
Dealing with Difficult Pasts in the Post-Communist 
Context
Since the 1990s, the idea that societies emerging from conflict and 
authoritarian rule needed to work through their difficult pasts and investi-
gate and redress past violations of human rights for successful transition 
and the construction of a peaceful future has become widely accepted.8 
The right to truth and reparative justice for victims has gradually been 
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codified as part of European and international law. Olick holds that 
post-war Western societies have adopted a politics of regret for histori-
cal injustices and reparations associated with it, which demand a criti-
cal examination of the past, as a new principle of political legitimation 
instead of the ‘heroic golden ages’ type of the pre-World War I era.9
For Olick, the discourse of universal human rights which advocates 
reparation, apology and acknowledgement to restore the dignity of vic-
tims and to deter new outbreaks of inhumanity has contributed to the 
emergence of this politics.10 On the one hand, under the pressure of 
Eastern European countries, European and global institutions have con-
demned the crimes of the communist regime in official declarations 
that unravelled earlier consensus about a special role of the Holocaust 
in European memory. On the other hand, the Eastern European coun-
tries have been pressured to espouse the Western European approach of 
regret which stipulates a critical re-examination of their own national 
past. The investigation of local involvement in the Holocaust and the 
acknowledgement of its significance have become one of the require-
ments for countries of the region to join the family of European states.11
As part of transitional justice measures, Eastern European states 
have implemented a variety of policies to investigate and prosecute the 
crimes of the communist era. Studies about the dealing with the com-
munist past in Eastern Europe have focused on lustration, the opening 
of secret police archives, rehabilitation and compensation of victims 
of mass repressions and other types of transitional justice.12 The key 
questions in this research have been to explain factors shaping different 
approaches to dealing with the communist past and pursuing historical 
justice. Furthermore, scholarly attention has concentrated on the rela-
tionship between transitional justice and democratization.13 The coming 
to terms with the communist past has also included history commis-
sions, national remembrance institutes, rewriting of history textbooks, 
museums of totalitarianism and communist theme parks.14
Stan has argued in what is one of the most comprehensive com-
parative studies on transitional justice in Eastern Europe and the for-
mer Soviet Union that the differences in the nature of transitional 
justice between countries of the region are rooted in the relationship 
between the regime and its opposition during the communist and post- 
communist periods (the strength of the opposition), the communist 
regime’s dominant methods for ensuring societal compliance with 
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its rule (repression or co-optation) and the pre-communist levels of 
political pluralism15. Nedelsky’s comparative study of two other coun-
tries that shared a communist past, but have differed in the way they 
approached the Soviet past (the Czech Republic and Slovakia) stud-
ies why the Czech Republic chose to ‘prosecute and punish’, while 
Slovakia chose to ‘forgive and forget’. Nedelsky explains this by the 
level of political legitimacy of the former communist regime. The 
lower level of legitimacy of the Soviet regime in the Czech Republic 
has been explained by higher levels of repression.16
Jaskovska and Moran have argued that homogeneity was a key 
explanatory factor of difference in the approaches to lustration between 
Latvia and Estonia, on the one hand, and Lithuania, on the other. Latvia 
and Estonia have not adopted lustration laws as they excluded the 
Russian minority from the political scene following the adoption of 
citizenship laws, and the reformed Communist Party never became a 
strong political force in those countries. Lithuania has adopted inclu-
sive citizenship laws and saw the re-emergence of reformed commu-
nists, which according to Jaskovska and Moran explains the adoption 
of the lustration laws in the country with the aim of dealing with com-
munist rivals.17
Together with dealing with the communist past, the collapse of the 
communist bloc saw new states actively engaging in the creation or 
reinvention of national memories, pantheons of national heroes and 
official historical accounts and narratives as part of the nation and 
collective identity-building process.18 Tucker has termed the produc-
tion of history for nation-building purposes ‘therapeutic history’, 
and argued that it became prevalent in Eastern Europe after the end 
of communism.19 At a deeper level, the production of therapeutic his-
tory and memory has reflected the trauma of lost statehood in the past 
centuries and the instability of national polities situated between the 
Western European countries and Russia. In their transnational intel-
lectual history view at Central Eastern Europe, Trencsényi, Janowski, 
Baár, Falina and Kopeček argue that ‘in the case of these relatively 
small and often highly unstable national contexts the very existence of 
the polity could not be taken for granted and the political and national 
communities rarely if ever came to overlap. All of this could also lead 
to the feeling – or even psychosis – of a collective “existential” threat 
of disappearance’.20
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While academic literature has tended to regard dealing with the 
 communist past and the use of history and memories for nation- building 
purposes as two separate areas of investigation, the case of Ukraine 
examined in the present article shows that the two have been closely 
interlinked. Dealing with the crimes of the communist regime has been 
inseparable from the promotion of a narrative of Ukrainian history cen-
tred on the struggle for national liberation that delegitimizes the Soviet 
Ukrainian statehood and reduces the Soviet period to totalitarianism 
and crimes. Such narratives were mythologized and preserved by the 
diaspora, then transmitted to the dissident organizations, embraced by 
the opposition parties during the late Soviet period and the local gov-
ernments in Western Ukraine and finally endorsed by the state at the 
national level following the change of power in the wake of Maidan in 
2004 and the Euromaidan in 2014. Both the recognition of the OUN 
and UPA as fighters for Ukrainian independence and the decommuniza-
tion policies have been regionally dividing and contributing to internal 
conflict in Ukraine. Transitional justice and work of memory have taken 
the shape of criminalization and elimination of some difficult pasts, and 
state endorsement of a ‘correct’ and ‘truthful’ reading of national his-
tory instead of dialogue and critical work with both of them.
Restoration of Historical Justice During the Late 
Perestroika Period in Soviet Ukraine
The emergence of a dissident movement in Soviet Ukraine became pos-
sible due to a degree of liberalization in the Soviet Union, the first wave 
of rehabilitation of the victims of Stalinism and a partial release of politi-
cal prisoners in the 1950s. Dissident organizations sustained contact with 
the Ukrainian diaspora organizations abroad and absorbed from them 
some elements of the nationalist discourse that the diaspora during the 
Cold War recoded as anti-Soviet, anti-totalitarian and democratic. Early 
human rights organizations focused on the crimes committed by the com-
munist regime in Soviet Ukraine, defined the Ukrainian people as the 
victims of repression and included the insurgent army based in Western 
Ukraine among the most important instances of national suffering.
The Ukrainian Public Group to Promote the Implementation of the 
Helsinki Accords was one of first human rights organizations created by 
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the dissident milieu in Soviet Ukraine in the mid-1970s. It stated in its 
declaration of principles that while the group’s goals were completely 
humanitarian, it could not avoid the nationality question as ‘most 
Ukrainian political prisoners have been sentenced for imagined or real 
nationalism’.21 The movement combined the exposition of historical 
injustices suffered by the Ukrainian people under Soviet rule such as 
the famine of 1932–3, political repression in the late 1930s, the destruc-
tion of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and repression in the 1960s22 
with the reporting on violations of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and the Helsinki Accords in Soviet Ukraine. The Helsinki group 
was banned soon after its creation and all thirty-seven members who 
joined the group experienced some form of persecution.
Attempting to rejuvenate the Soviet regime and distance himself 
from the older Soviet elites (above all the security apparatus), Mikhail 
Gorbachev restarted the process of exposing the crimes of the Stalinist 
regime, filling the ‘blank spots’ of history and rehabilitating the victims 
of past repressions. Rehabilitated dissidents and former political pris-
oners began to play an important role in shaping the political agenda 
in Soviet Ukraine, casting themselves as voices untainted by collabo-
ration with the repressive Soviet regime. In August 1987, Vyacheslav 
Chornovil, a dissident and a former political prisoner who would chair 
the most important opposition movement in Ukraine in 1989, sent an 
open letter to Gorbachev, in which he regretted that the declared demo-
cratic revival of Soviet society as a result of glasnost and perestroika 
remained ‘a revolution of words’.23
In this letter, Chornovil also highlighted ‘blank spots’ of Ukrainian 
history which had to be brought to light as ‘[a]ttempts at writing 
the twentieth century history of Ukraine solely as the history of the 
Bolshevik Party in Ukraine [which] have resulted in silence on many 
facts concerning the social and national struggle of the Ukrainian 
nation in the first decades of the twentieth century… .’ One ‘blank spot’ 
Chornovil mentioned was ‘the partisan and underground struggle’ in 
Western Ukraine in the 1940s and early 1950s that was ‘the beloved 
theme of Soviet propaganda, which has for decades specialized in expos-
ing “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism”’. In relation to the movement, 
Chornovil argued that ‘We need to take a calmer and broader look, to 
find out the reasons for this mass popular movement in which hundreds 
of thousands of people, not bandits, initially took part, supported by 
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the majority of the population of Western Ukraine’. He concluded that 
he did not ‘view certain aspects of the national movement of 1920–40 
in Western Ukraine in a simplified way … the right to critical views I 
earned in prison, where I spent time together with participants in this 
movement’.24
The Ukrainian Helsinki Union was founded in 1988 as a federa-
tion of self-governing human rights defence groups, which had as its 
declared purpose the defence of national rights, above all, the defence 
of the right of nations to self-determination as provided in Article I of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, because ‘the 
nation is the sole natural social environment in which an individual 
can fully develop his abilities and fulfil his purpose on this earth’.25 
The Union claimed that the government of the Ukrainian SSR, which 
had never been a truly sovereign body, nor the Communist Party of 
Ukraine, which was merely a subdivision of the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union, had the power or the inclination to ‘protect the popu-
lation of Ukraine from total famine, from the barbaric destruction of 
the nation’s productive forces and intellectual potential, from the dena-
tionalization of Ukrainians and the non-Russian minorities, and from 
artificial changes in the ethnic composition of Ukraine’. The claim was 
put in the context of ‘outright genocide and the continuing ethnocide of 
the indigenous population of Ukraine’.
Thus, the Union held that the restoration of Ukrainian statehood 
was fundamental to secure the economic, social, cultural, civil and 
political rights of both the Ukrainian people and national minorities.26 
Some persons associated with the OUN and UPA, for example Yuriy 
Shukhevych, the son of the UPA commander Roman Shukhevych, were 
among members of the Helsinki group. They argued for the inclusion of 
nationalist organizations among the historical injustices committed by 
the Soviet Union and raised now by the dissident movement.
The opposition movement consolidated into the People’s Movement 
of Ukraine for Perebudova [Rukh] in September 1989. The Programme 
of the Movement adopted in 1989 started with a verdict of the existing 
system, which it described in terms of an acute crisis resulting from 
the forced introduction of the Stalinist model of totalitarian pseudo-
socialism. It provided an overview of the historical development 
of Ukrainian statehood and the suffering of the Ukrainian people in 
the twentieth century. Rukh declared as its goal the construction of a 
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democratic and humanistic society in Ukraine and the prevention of 
denationalization.27
The opposition organizations and then political parties that emerged 
during the late perestroika period addressed in one way or another the 
‘national question’ in relation to past injustices; some questioned the 
legitimacy of the communist regime in Ukraine. The opposition parties 
held that the revival of the Ukrainian nation, its language, historical 
memory and traditions as well as those of other nationalities, that fol-
lowed the decades of denationalization, was a form of restitution for 
past injustices. Some organizations also argued that national statehood 
was a natural form for the survival of the Ukrainian people. Another 
important characteristic of the early discourse of the opposition was a 
combination of the national liberation struggle with democratization 
and the fight for human rights and historical justice.
Undoing the Soviet Past and Forging a New Political 
Memory in Western Ukraine
As of the late 1980s, Western Ukraine and the rest of Ukraine followed 
different paths in dealing with the communist past. Soviet rule in what 
would become Lvivska, Ternopilska, Ivano-Frankivska, Zakarpatska, 
Chernivetska, Volynska and Rivnenska oblasts of Ukraine was estab-
lished during World War II. According to the survey conducted in the 
framework of the Region, Nation and Beyond project in 2013, support 
for the recognition of the OUN and UPA as fighters for the independ-
ence of Ukraine was the highest in three oblasts in Western Ukraine 
(Fig. 1): 90.6% of the population in Ivano-Frankivska oblast, 92.4% 
in Lvivska oblast and 94.5% in Ternopilska oblast. The two nearby 
oblasts, Volynska and Rivnenska, the region of UPA emergence and 
action, come next in terms of support for the OUN and UPA. At the 
same time, the recognition of the two nationalist organizations as ‘fight-
ers for Ukrainian independence’ was supported only by 32.4% of the 
population nationwide, and 37.4% opposed such a proposition in 2013. 
80.6% in Donetska oblast opposed it.28
Furthermore, another survey conducted by the Razumkov Center in 
December 2015 in all regions of Ukraine except for Crimea and the 
non-government controlled areas of Luhanska and Donetska oblasts 
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showed that Western Ukraine (comprising Lvivska, Ternopilska, 
Ivano-Frankivska, Zakarpatska, Chernivetska, Volynska and Rivnenska 
oblasts) stood out in Ukraine with the highest share (27.9%) of those 
who define the Ukrainian nation in cultural terms (the use of Ukrainian 
language, respect for national traditions, and education in accordance 
with such traditions) and the lowest share of those who define the 
Ukrainian nation in civic terms (Ukrainian citizenship, irrespective of 
ethnic and linguistic background). The region also shows the highest 
support for decommunization. At the same time, Western Ukraine had 
the highest share of those who considered themselves European (56% 
vs 29% nationwide).29
Several parties created in the late 1980s and early 1990s in Western 
Ukraine integrated certain historical memories into their program-
matic goals. They articulated the vision of Ukrainian history as cen-
tred on the national liberation struggle that linked the Kyivan Rus, the 
Cossack state, the UNR (Ukrainian People’s Republic) and ZUNR 
(Western Ukrainian People’s Republic), and the OUN and UPA strug-
gle, while qualifying the period of Soviet rule as occupation and the 
Figure 1. Negative answers to the question ‘Do you consider the OUN and UPA as 
fighters for independence of Ukraine?’ (Source: Survey 2013; see note 28).
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Soviet Ukrainian state as illegitimate. The programme of the Ukrainian 
National Party created in Lviv in October 1989 considered the aggres-
sion of Russia against the Ukrainian People’s Republic in 1918 illegal 
and saw it as the beginning of the period of occupation. It regarded 
the restoration by the OUN of the Ukrainian Independent United State 
on 30 June 1941, during Nazi occupation, as well as the fight of the 
UPA on two fronts against Nazi Germany and Bolshevik Russia, as part 
of a continuous fight of the Ukrainian people for state independence 
in the twentieth century. It declared the Ukrainian SSR as an artificial 
structure and a colonial administration of Ukraine.30 Similar historical 
references and the statement about the invalidity of the union agree-
ment were made by the Ukrainian Popular Democratic Party created 
in May 1990.31 Another party created in Lviv in April 1990, the State 
Independence of Ukraine, which included among its members former 
OUN and UPA fighters, declared that it accepted as members only 
Ukrainians and those who were not connected to the Communist Party, 
and that it was based on OUN ideology.32
Following the March 1990 national and local elections, deputies 
from the opposition parties received a majority of votes in Lvivska, 
Ternopilska, and Ivano-Frankivska oblasts. The Lviv Oblast Council 
was headed by Vyacheslav Chornovil in 1990–2. The newly recon-
stituted bodies of local governance came into conflict with the local 
bodies of the Communist Party and the law enforcement bodies. 
On 30 March 1990, as the fears of lustration of the law enforcement 
bodies at the local level mounted, the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada 
of the Ukrainian SSR decided to resubordinate the mass media and local 
law enforcement bodies from the local to the central level. Due to pres-
sures by Rukh and the demonstrations by local residents, oblast councils 
passed decisions to dismantle monuments to Lenin in the three biggest 
cities of Western Ukraine in the autumn of 1990: Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv 
and Ternopil. This was followed by a wide decommunization campaign 
across the entire region consisting in the removal of monuments and the 
renaming of Soviet era toponyms.
While there were debates in the local councils about the  lustration 
of the Communist Party nomenklatura, it was decided not to follow this 
path. Different levels of legitimacy of the former communist regime and 
the strength of the Communist Party explain the  different approaches 
to decommunization in Western Ukraine and the rest of Ukraine. 
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A generally mild approach to decommunization consisting mostly in 
the removal of monumental symbols of communism and the renaming 
of Soviet toponyms in Western Ukraine can be explained by the ethnic 
homogeneity of the region and a quick disintegration of the Communist 
Party at the regional level. At the same time, mild decommunization 
was accompanied by the creation of a new political memory grounded 
in the living cultural memory33 built around the national liberation strug-
gle for independence, which also included the OUN and UPA struggle. 
In general, the nationalist underground warfare combined with cultural 
links with the West created a system of individual, collective, political 
and cultural memories that sets Western Ukraine apart from the rest of 
the country.34
Already during the last years of the Soviet Union, the sites related 
to the life of the leaders of OUN and UPA became places of pilgrimage 
and public commemoration. This period also saw the rebirth of a tradi-
tion instituted during the early twentieth century and popularized by 
the OUN during the interwar period: the erection of symbolic mounds 
in the memory of Ukrainians who died for liberty. This symbolized the 
rebirth of the cult of the ‘fighters for Ukrainian independence’ that com-
bined the fighters for the Ukrainian state (Sichovi Striltsi) of the early 
twentieth century with the OUN and UPA fighters. After the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, symbolic mounds were perceived as markers of 
the rebirth of memories that had been repressed by the Soviet regime 
and the restoration of historical justice, and as symbols of the fight for 
an independent Ukraine. In addition to the spread of symbolic mounds, 
other monuments, memorials and museums dedicated to the national-
ist leaders were constructed across Western Ukraine.35 The first monu-
ment to Stepan Bandera, the leader of a radical OUN faction, in Ivano-
Frankivska oblast was opened on 14 October 1990, several days after 
the decision to dismantle the monument to Lenin in Ivano-Frankivsk. 
Local authorities, along with the clergy, nationalist organizations and 
political parties claiming the legacy of OUN and UPA, participated 
in commemorative ceremonies dedicated to the national-liberation 
struggle.
Claiming that post-Soviet Ukrainian independence was a legacy of 
the OUN and UPA struggle, the opposition movement, other parties 
and local authorities in Western Ukraine demanded a recognition for 
the OUN and UPA similar to the Soviet veterans. Some local councils 
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in Western Ukraine officially recognized the OUN and UPA as fighters 
for Ukrainian independence and provided additional social benefits to 
OUN and UPA veterans. In 1995–7, several oblast and rayon coun-
cils of Western Ukraine adopted legislation that recognized the UPA 
as a combatant in World War II and its veterans as fighters for freedom 
and independence of Ukraine on the territory of oblasts with the corre-
sponding benefits from local budgets. Although the legality of the local 
decisions was questioned by the national prosecutor’s office, the deci-
sions have never been annulled as contradicting national legislation.
Compromises at the National Level
The opposition parties did not get a majority of votes in the national 
parliament following the March 1990 elections. The declaration of 
state sovereignty in July 1990 and state independence in August 1991, 
after the putsch in Moscow, as well as the banning of the Communist 
Party of Ukraine for alleged participation in the putsch in 1991 and the 
nationalization of its property, all became possible due to a compro-
mise between the opposition and a number of Communist Party mem-
bers. Leonid Kravchuk, a former member of the Political Bureau of 
the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, won the 
presidential elections in December 1991. The legal succession with the 
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was recognized by law in 1991. A 
symbolic succession with the UNR declared in 1917 took place on 22 
January 1992 when Mykola Plavyuk, the president of the UNR in exile, 
handed over the state insignia to the first democratically elected presi-
dent of post-Soviet Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk. The Communist Party 
registered anew in October 1993 and later the Constitutional Court of 
Ukraine recognized the ban as unconstitutional.
The opposition parties and national communists agreed on some res-
titution measures to rectify past injustices. The Verkhovna Rada of the 
Ukrainian SSR adopted the Law on the Rehabilitation of Victims of 
Political Repressions on 17 April 1991 that complemented the earlier 
Soviet Union-wide legislation on rehabilitation and covered the entire 
period between 1917 and 1991. The law declared that ‘Millions of inno-
cent people were persecuted for their political activities, statements and 
religious beliefs on the basis of inhumane and anti-democratic laws 
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and outright lawlessness and tyranny. An especially difficult legacy 
of the past is mass repressions committed by the Stalinist regime and 
its leaders in the republic.’ The parliament condemned the past repres-
sions and declared an intention to restore justice.36 During the debate 
on the law in parliament, some representatives of the opposition parties 
challenged the fundamental assumption of the law about the legality of 
Soviet statehood, as they considered the period of Soviet rule to have 
been one of occupation.
The political rehabilitation of victims of mass repression went 
hand in hand with the work of historians, publicists and civil society 
organizations such as Memorial, investigating the ‘blank spots’ of 
Soviet history. The topic of Soviet repression became one of extensive 
research areas for the Ukrainian academia. In 1992, the Chairman of 
the Security Service of Ukraine Yevhen Marchuk, the President of the 
National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Borys Paton, and academician of 
NAS of Ukraine, Petro Tronko, sent an appeal to the state authorities 
demanding the establishment of multi-volume scientific and documen-
tary  publications of the victims of repression in Ukraine. Soon after the 
parliament approved a resolution approving the project.
This established the precedent of close cooperation between the 
security service and the leading national academic institutions on the 
questions of history. By becoming directly involved in the process of the 
investigation of the ‘dark pages’ of history, the security service wanted 
to maintain control over the information that was made public. Between 
2002 and 2015, the project published one hundred volumes represent-
ing all oblasts of Ukraine. Each volume includes an introductory article 
explaining regional particularities of repressions, the names, biogra-
phies and the circumstances of arrest of thousands of victims of mass 
repression from 1917 until 1991.37 The work was based on the assump-
tion that the analysis, based on documents and scientific research, of 
how the Soviet repressive machine functioned in all regions of Soviet 
Ukraine could serve as a guarantee that similar crimes would not repeat 
in the future. By the middle of 2015, the project documented 720,000 
victims of political repression in Soviet Ukraine between 1917 and 
1991.38 A National Bank of victims of political repressions (electronic 
martyrologue) was also created.
Soon after the March 1990 elections, members of parliament from 
the opposition raised the question of the official rehabilitation of OUN 
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and UPA at the national level, as part of the process of the restoration 
of historical justice. The proposal of the opposition parties to include 
the OUN and UPA among organizations to be rehabilitated by the 
Law on the Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repressions was not 
supported by parliament because of the opposition of the Communist 
Party. The latter, as well as other left-wing parties, have remained 
opponents of OUN and UPA recognition. They saw commemorations 
of the OUN and UPA in Western Ukraine as the desecration of the 
memory of tens of thousands of civilians murdered by ‘OUN-UPA 
gangs’.39
Also, the veteran groups have consistently opposed the revision 
of the Soviet narrative of the Great Patriotic War, while they feared 
that official recognition of the OUN and UPA would lead to a revi-
sion of their social status and benefits. In 1993, parliament adopted the 
law on the Status of the Veterans of War that recognized as veterans 
all those who fought for the Soviet motherland, including secret ser-
vice veterans and extermination battalions that had fought against the 
underground movement in Western Ukraine. After intensive debates 
between the opposition and the left-wing parties, the law also recog-
nized UPA members who fought against the German-fascist occupiers 
of Ukraine in 1941–4, and who did not commit crimes against human-
ity. It did not, however, include UPA fighters who fought against the 
Soviet regime.40
After the 1994 and 1998 parliamentary elections, the renewed 
Communist Party became the most important faction in parliament. It 
blamed the previous government for the socio-economic decline and 
looting of state wealth. The post-1994 period was a battle between the 
parliament and president Leonid Kuchma, who was elected in 1994. A 
new anti-communist majority was formed in parliament in 2000. This 
majority adopted some decisions that demonstrated a symbolic rupture 
with the Soviet past. It discontinued the connection with the Soviet 
Ukrainian parliament by deciding that the first session of parliament 
of independent Ukraine had begun only with the first competitive elec-
tions in March 1990. It also turned 7 and 8 November, at that time bank 
holidays commemorating the Great October socialist revolution, into 
normal working days. At the same time, Kuchma supported the pro-
posal of the Council of Veterans of Ukraine of May 1994 to establish 
a series of awards destined for the veterans of the Great Patriotic War. 
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In 1999, Kuchma introduced a special medal ‘To the defender of the 
Motherland’ for the veterans of the Great Patriotic War.
While some steps were taken to redress the crimes of the commu-
nist regime in the form of documentary research and a rehabilitation of 
victims of mass repression, the question of criminal responsibility for 
the crimes remained open. There was a tacit agreement between the 
opposition and the former communist elites who supported the procla-
mation of independence not to pursue the path of retribution. Myroslav 
Marynovych noted that Ukrainian dissidents, including himself, who 
‘relinquished the right to punish our offenders’ were also partly to blame 
for the failure to deal with the communist past. Dissidents, according 
to Marynovych, did not become judges because they ‘believed that the 
lawsuit against the perpetrators of communist crimes would undermine 
all order in society as it would turn it into a massive revenge, slander 
and cynical settlement of accounts’, as communism had made everyone 
guilty.41
The first president of post-Soviet Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, saw 
his legacy in his ability to ensure societal peace and avoid the ‘Yugoslav 
scenario’ in Ukraine. In his memoirs, he avoided the question of his 
personal responsibility for the Soviet past. He considered that the very 
question about the repentance of the Communist Party was nonsensi-
cal because the crimes of the party were so enormous (repressions, the 
totalitarian regime, wars, intrusion into the interests of other peoples 
and wars in Afghanistan, Hungary and Czechoslovakia) that the peo-
ple would not be able to forgive them.42 For him, the responsibility 
for the crimes was entirely with the Moscow Politburo, and he pre-
sented the Soviet Ukrainian division of the party as mere ‘slaves’ of 
Moscow. He also distanced himself from the party nomenklatura and 
the renewed Communist Party of post-Soviet Ukraine, blaming them 
for a lack of support for the independence of Ukraine and for loyalty to 
a non-existing state (the Soviet Union). He divided all political parties 
into Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian, with the Communist Party repre-
senting the latter.43 At the same time, he noted that he did not support 
lustration of the party nomenklatura as proposed by some ‘democratic 
 orthodox’.44 Finally, Kravchuk refuted the claims of the right-wing par-
ties that they had successfully fought for independence. For him, this 
had been achieved by national communists, who had headed the pro-
cess of state creation and voted for independence on 24 August 1991.45
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Construction of a ‘Common National Memory’ after the 
Orange Revolution (Maidan)
Coming to power in 2004 on the Maidan promise to punish the ‘bandits’ 
and corrupt officials of the previous government, Viktor Yushchenko 
felt that he had to implement policies that showed rupture with the 
past. He became the first president of independent Ukraine who del-
egitimized the Soviet past at the national level by considering Soviet 
rule as a period of occupation starting in 1918. Yushchenko mirrored 
Marynovych’s views that because there had been no condemnation or 
a trial of communism, parades carrying portraits of Stalin could still 
be held in Ukraine in the second decade of the twenty-first century, 
while people who subscribed to ideas that killed millions of persons in 
1932–3 and in 1937–8 could still have a seat in parliament.46
Yushchenko further developed the narrative assumed by dissidents 
several decades earlier, which combined the discourse of suffering dur-
ing the communist totalitarian regime and of the subsequent national 
liberation, with a discourse of democratization and Europeanization. 
While associating himself with the European discourse of reconcili-
ation and celebrating the success of Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation, 
Yushchenko justified the heroization of Ukrainian fighters for inde-
pendence. According to Yushchenko, after years of deceitful Soviet 
propaganda, it was necessary to restore justice, and call heroes as such 
and forgive their sins.47 For him, part of the population still had views 
instilled in them by Soviet propaganda. He considered that Ukrainians 
needed to become patriots of Ukraine who loved their own language, 
education, culture and literature, and who had their own national mem-
ory, remembering the national heroes who created the nation and laid 
the foundations of its independence.48
After the break-up of the coalition with his former allies in the 
Orange revolution, Yushchenko had to search for a compromise with 
his former rival, the Party of Regions. He justified the fact that he had 
not fulfilled one of the Maidan promises, to prosecute those guilty of 
crimes during the previous regime, by referring to the need to preserve 
peace in the country and focus on the future.49 He defined the 2004 
Maidan and the 2013–4 protests as a ‘civil conflict’ and considered 
the memorandum of understanding with the opposition as a first step 
towards the resolution of conflicts.50 At the same time, Yushchenko held 
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that there could be no monuments to Lenin in Kyiv, which he regarded 
as symbols of Soviet occupation.51
Yushchenko mentioned that he had proposed to President Putin that 
they follow the example of the Ukrainian-Polish dialogue, which led 
to the mutual acknowledgement of guilt and reconciliation. However, 
Putin said that Russia could not accept responsibility for the Soviet 
or tsarist government and for their mistakes.52 Yushchenko held that 
Russia found it difficult to accept a Christian position of reconciliation 
because it was an empire that historically sacralized political authority 
and rejected the notion of guilt.53
During Yushchenko’s presidency, the state created new institutions, 
such as the UINM, with the mandate to promote the development of a 
shared national historical memory. It also introduced new commemora-
tions related to the Holomodor, the famine of 1932–3, and to activities 
of the OUN and UPA. In contrast to similar institutes in other Eastern 
European countries, which became central to the process of lustration 
and were nominally independent from the government, the UINM was 
created as a governmental body. Its role was limited to the develop-
ment of state policy and research in the field of memory, and it had a 
relatively small budget and staff. The UINM assumed a bigger role with 
the adoption of the decommunization laws, and gained full access to 
the secret police archives following the Euromaidan. However, it has 
played no role in the process of lustration, which began in 2014.
Furthermore, in 2005 Yushchenko initiated the celebration of 14 
October as the day of the Ukrainian army and the foundation of the UPA. 
The Holodomor was recognized by parliament as a genocide against the 
Ukrainian people in 2006. The legislation about the Holodomor con-
demned Soviet functionaries who were its perpetrators and mandated 
the removal of monuments to them. Although the legislation did not list 
the names of perpetrators, it was invoked by some nationalistic parties 
as legal grounds for removing Lenin statues. A criminal case against 
the Soviet functionaries who ‘carried out the genocide in Ukraine in 
1932–3, as a result of which millions of citizens died’ was initiated by 
the Security Service of Ukraine at the request of President Yushchenko 
in 2009. In January 2010, the Kyiv Appellate Court heard the case and 
found that Stalin and several other high Soviet functionaries planned 
and committed genocide. The case was closed, however, because the 
defendants were deceased.
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On the occasion of the sixty-fifth anniversary of the creation of 
the UPA in 2007, Yushchenko issued a decree on commemorative 
 measures to ‘restore national memory and historic justice, strengthen 
societal harmony and consolidate society’.54 On the same day, he issued 
another decree to commemorate the hundredth anniversary of Roman 
Shukhevych’s birth, granting him the status of ‘Hero of Ukraine’ ‘for a 
considerable personal contribution to the national liberation struggle for 
liberty and independence of Ukraine’.55 As part of these measures, an 
exhibition dedicated to the OUN and UPA was opened at the Museum 
of the Great Patriotic War in Kyiv. Apart from setting up this controver-
sial exhibition, the museum in general was ‘ukrainized’ by adding the 
Ukrainian national flag and other Ukrainian symbols (Figs. 2 and 3), 
and highlighting the role of Ukrainians during the war in the museum’s 
narrative.
A stand about the OUN and UPA (Fig. 4) was added to the exhibition 
room dedicated to the partisan movement, offering a narrative that was 
similar to the way it was represented in school textbooks. It contained the 
Figure 2. Two tanks at the entry to the Great Patriotic War museum painted in the 
colours of the Ukrainian flag (Source: photographed by the author, 13 April 2013).
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photos and biographies of several prominent OUN members (excluding 
Stepan Bandera) and of Roman Shukhevych, some propaganda docu-
ments about the organizations, and official documents and letters by the 
organizations’ members. In general, the stand provided little interpreta-
tion and allowed the documents to speak for themselves. The materials 
did not cover any controversial issues or alternative views related to 
the two organizations. The guided tours observed by the author in the 
museum in April 2013 and October 2016 avoided the OUN and UPA 
stand and went directly to a reconstructed dugout of Soviet partisans 
situated in the opposite corner of the exhibition room. Thus, even if the 
museum staff had to abide by the official pressure to introduce the OUN 
and UPA narrative in the museum, it could resist, ignore or subvert it in 
Figure 3. A Soviet soldier in the lobby of the museum in front of the Ukrainian flag 
(Source: photographed by the author, 13 April 2013).
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more subtle ways. Some members of the Communist Party of Ukraine 
and of the Party of Regions protested against the OUN and UPA stand. 
However, it was not dismantled even during the presidency of Viktor 
Yanukovych.
In 2008, the Liberation Movement Research Centre based in Lviv, 
the Security Service of Ukraine and the UINM developed a narrative 
about the OUN and UPA that was turned into a moving poster exhibi-
tion ‘The Ukrainian Insurgent Army. The History of the Unsubdued’. 
The narratives of the exhibition were published as a separate brochure 
with Volodymyr Vyatrovych, an employee of the UINM and advisor to 
the Head of the Security Service at that time, as its lead author.56 The 
brochure included a foreword by Yushchenko, who stated that finally 
Ukraine was discovering its ‘national memory’ and ‘real history’ about 
the ‘heroic struggle of Ukrainians for their own statehood’, represented 
above all by the UPA, the history of which had been silenced, prohib-
ited or distorted by the Soviet regime.57 In his introductory word to the 
Figure 4. A stand dedicated to the OUN and UPA in Room 8, dedicated to the partisan 
‘Anti-fascist resistance movement of the Ukrainian people’ (Source: photographed by 
the author, 13 April 2013).
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brochure, Vyatrovych recast the history of Ukraine as the history of the 
fight of the Ukrainian people for independence.58 This became the lens 
that defined the entire narrative and presented both OUN and UPA as 
heroic organizations that fought against two totalitarian systems, the 
Nazi and the communist. The narrative was presented as ‘objective 
truth’, based on new archival data disclosed by the Security Service of 
Ukraine with the hope that the information campaign about ‘the truth’ 
across Ukraine would allow to overcome the current controversies and 
misperceptions and to create a common national memory. The promo-
tion of the narrative dwelled on state resources.
The most controversial decisions were taken by Yushchenko at the 
very end of his presidency in January 2010. These included the recog-
nition of Stepan Bandera as ‘Hero of Ukraine’59 and a decree ‘About 
the commemoration of the participants in the fight for independence of 
Ukraine in the twentieth century’.60 Yushchenko acknowledged that the 
recognition and heroization of the national liberation movement at the 
national level was a difficult and controversial act, which would not be 
supported by the majority of the population. He nevertheless adopted 
a decree granting the title of Hero of Ukraine to Stepan Bandera dur-
ing the last months of his presidency. He believed that it was his last 
chance to do so, as he would not be re-elected as president, and he did 
not expect that in the next ten to fifteen years such a decision would be 
adopted.61
Yushchenko hoped that his decision would make the two-thirds of 
the population who did not support Bandera’s rehabilitation because 
they were ‘ill-informed’, change their mind.62 He also rejected the 
arguments of those who claimed that the OUN could not be heroized 
because it used violence and terrorism to achieve its goals. For him, the 
most important criterion for heroization was what a person had done for 
the nation.63 The decree ‘About the commemoration of the participants 
in the fight for independence of Ukraine in the twentieth century’ recog-
nized a number of military formations, parties, organizations and move-
ments that had fought for Ukrainian independence, including the OUN 
and UPA. The decree called for the development of teaching materials 
about the fight for independence in the twentieth century, the renaming 
of public spaces after independence fighters and the holding of com-
memorative ceremonies in their honour.
The decree about Bandera was followed by public debates and pro-
tests of the EU and other Western institutions. The debate involved 
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Ukrainian and foreign scholars and public intellectuals specialized in 
nationalist organizations and the public use of history. The main con-
tributions to the debate were published.64 At the same time, the 2010 
decree on the participants in the fight for independence of Ukraine in 
the twentieth century received much less public attention and criticism.
Partial Undoing of the Nationalist Heroic Past and 
the Interregional Memory Politics During Viktor 
Yanukovych’s Presidency
Soon after the victory of Viktor Yanukovych in the presidential elec-
tions in 2010, Bandera’s status as the Hero of Ukraine was annulled 
by a Donetsk court. Furthermore, the UINM was closed and then rein-
stated in a downgraded status. During Yanukovych’s presidency, sev-
eral pieces of legislation were adopted concerning the commemora-
tion of the Great Patriotic War, in particular the flying of the red ‘flag 
of victory’ along the Ukrainian national flag on Victory Day (9 May). 
The pro-Yanukovych Party of Regions also submitted a draft law to 
the parliament against the heroization of the OUN and UPA in 2013. 
At the same time, the law concerning the Holodomor and the decrees 
on granting the status of Hero of Ukraine to Roman Shukhevych and 
on the commemoration of the fight for independence remained in force. 
Also, the commemorative traditions concerning the Holodomor contin-
ued across Ukraine.
During this period, memory work concerning the OUN and UPA 
again shifted to Western Ukraine. Local authorities protested against 
Yanukovych’s memory politics by affirming the nationalist nar-
rative, glorifying the struggle for independence at the local level. 
The Lviv City Council adopted its own calendar of important dates 
when the national flag was to be officially flown, which included the 
restoration of the Ukrainian state by the OUN during Nazi occupa-
tion (30 June), the days of victims of political repression and fam-
ine, the day of the Ukrainian Army and the UPA (14 October) and 
the end of World War II in Europe (8 May), in addition to Victory 
Day (9 May).65 Furthermore, the Lviv Oblast Council adopted 
a decision that restored the title of the Hero of Ukraine to Stepan 
Bandera in 201166 and created a scholarship named after Bandera 
MYSHLOVSKA
396 HCM 2019, VOL. 7
in 2012.67 Similar decisions were adopted by other city and village 
councils across Western Ukraine. In 2012, at the initiative of the far-
right Svoboda Party, the Lviv Oblast Council also banned the use of 
Soviet, Communist and Nazi symbols on official buildings and in 
mass rallies taking place within Lvivska oblast, in response to the 
2011 amendment initiated by Yanukovych about the flying of the red 
flag. The Museum of the Liberation Struggle of Ukraine (part of the 
Lviv History Museum) was opened in Lviv in 2012.
The national liberation struggle and in particular the OUN and UPA 
narrative turned into instruments used in interregional and centre-
periphery struggles. They became acts of resistance to the Yanukovych 
regime, which was widely seen as corrupt and anti-Ukrainian. Many 
new public memory elements introduced in Western Ukraine such as 
the celebration of the end of World War II on 8 May and the prohibition 
of the use of Soviet, Communist and Nazi symbols on official build-
ings would be transplanted to the national level after the Euromaidan. 
The legislation adopted at the regional and local levels in Western 
Ukraine was in contradiction with national legislation, but it remained 
unaddressed by the national bodies. Decisions violating national leg-
islation, for example concerning the use of Russian and the exercise 
of local autonomy, were also adopted by some local governments in 
Eastern and Southern Ukraine. There were no working mechanisms 
able to resolve the contradictions between central and local levels, 
which would come to a head in the outbreak of the conflict in Eastern 
Ukraine.
The Decommunization Laws and the ‘Democratization’ 
of Nationalist Discourse after the Euromaidan Revolution
Following the Euromaidan protests and with the beginning of the armed 
conflict in Eastern Ukraine, the recognition of the OUN and UPA as 
fighters for independence and the elimination of the Soviet heritage 
became the two principal goals of the state’s memory politics. As ear-
lier during the presidency of Yushchenko, the purpose of the policies 
was to ‘other’ Russia and prove that Ukraine had a distinct (i.e. non-
Russian) history and historical memory. This was believed to serve as 
a necessary condition for successful democratization and development. 
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Furthermore, in the condition of war, the politics of memory was pre-
sented as a matter of national security.
In September 2014, President Poroshenko stated that although the 
issue of OUN and UPA had in the past divided Ukraine, in times of war 
it would be most appropriate to recognize these organizations as role 
models of heroism.68 All major initiatives in the field of memory initi-
ated by Yushchenko and by local authorities in Western Ukraine during 
the presidency of Yanukovych were reinforced during Poroshenko’s 
presidency. In 2014, the UPA Day on 14 October was selected to replace 
the Day of the Defender of the Fatherland (23 February), which had 
been the Day of the Soviet Army in Soviet times.69 The UINM further 
Figure 5. A moving poster exhibition ‘UPA – the answer of the unsubdued people’ 
next to the building of the Kyiv City Council (Source: photographed by the author, 
12 September 2017).
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expanded the practice of moving poster exhibitions dedicated to the 
OUN and UPA, aiming to educate citizens about the organizations dur-
ing the post-Euromaidan period (Fig. 5).
The law ‘About the perpetuation of victory over Nazism in the 
Second World War 1939–1945’ recoded the ‘Great Patriotic War’ as the 
‘Second World War’, introduced the official celebration of 8 May as 
the day of reconciliation, and mentioned the UPA veterans along with 
the Soviet ones, thus giving them equal status. It also annulled the 2000 
law on the commemoration of the victory in the Great Patriotic War 
adopted under Kuchma and updated by Yanukovych in 2011. While 
during Yushchenko’s presidency, only one law on the Holodomor was 
passed by the parliament, while other issues related to the promotion 
of the national liberation struggle were affirmed through presidential 
decrees, during Poroshenko’s presidency the parliament passed four 
decommunization laws as well as the lustration law that followed the 
outlawing of the Communist Party of Ukraine. National consolidation 
around the narrative of the fight for independence was presented not 
only as an indispensable step on the way to becoming a democratic 
European state, but it was also justified as a way of combatting the 
hybrid warfare now waged by Russia. The development and justifica-
tion of the grand national narrative has been supported by the same state 
institutions as in Yushchenko’s times, in particular the UINM and the 
Security Service of Ukraine.
Conclusion
History remains a fundamental means of political legitimation in post-
Soviet states. This explains the incessant battles around history and 
memory in these countries. This is one of the legacies of the imperial 
and Soviet pasts during which liberal democratic ways of political legit-
imation, such as democratic elections, were slow to emerge. Richard 
Pipes summarized the nature of the instrumentalization of history during 
Soviet times in a comment, which encapsulates the defining idea behind 
memory and history politics in post-Soviet countries: ‘The Communists 
asserted that they had been chosen by history to accomplish mankind’s 
momentous transition from a class-based society to a classless one. For 
this reason, the manner in which modern Russian history was presented 
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and taught was to them of much greater importance than it is to socie-
ties whose legitimacy rests on a popular mandate.’70
The core assumption of the post-Soviet period in Ukraine has been 
that common historical memory, myths, values and traditions are nec-
essary for the successful transformation of the state. This assumption 
has been reflected both in the state’s policies and in popular beliefs. 
The 2015 survey conducted by the Razumkov Centre showed that the 
three most important things Ukrainians are most proud of include sports 
achievements (73%), the history of Ukraine (69%) and the national 
character of Ukrainians and their ability to fight for their state and their 
rights (68%). In comparison, only 33% are proud about the fair and 
just attitude to different social groups and 22% of the way democracy 
works.71 These popular beliefs show that while Ukrainians are divided 
in their attitudes to the past, they are united by the belief that history 
matters and are not fully convinced yet by the merits of democracy.
The specificity of the case of Ukraine is that the Soviet regime 
had different levels of legitimacy in Western Ukraine and the rest of 
Ukraine, which became the defining factor in the way Ukraine dealt 
with its communist past. In Western Ukraine, the opposition took the 
majority of votes in the first competitive elections in March 1990 and 
the Communist Party never recovered at the regional level, therefore 
it was unnecessary to pursue lustration. Starting with the late pere-
stroika period, the region pursued a mild decommunization, by remov-
ing Soviet monuments and changing Soviet toponyms. At the same 
time, local councils adopted legislation delegitimizing Soviet rule and 
 officially recognizing OUN and UPA as ‘fighters for Ukrainian inde-
pendence’ in violation of national legislation. At the national level, 
the proclamation of sovereignty and independence in 1990 and 1991 
became  possible due to cooperation between the opposition and ‘sov-
ereign  communists’, thus there was no lustration of the former party 
nomenklatura at the national level either. The former security ser-
vices retained control over access to the secret police archives until 
the Orange revolution and actively participated in shaping the terms of 
dealing with past injustices.
Until the Orange revolution, all political leaders had to search for 
a compromise of sorts between political forces representing different 
regions and between different legitimizing narratives. They saw their 
legacy in the preservation of peace and mutual understanding between 
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different regions. Even Viktor Yushchenko, who initiated a memory 
policy distinct from his predecessors and his immediate successor at 
the national level, had to search for a compromise with his former rival, 
Viktor Yanukovych. The weakening of the representation of Eastern 
and Southern Ukraine after the 2014 elections and the banning of the 
Communist Party changed the political landscape and diminished the 
necessity to search for compromise. This allowed decommunization 
laws and the law on lustration to be adopted, which covered both the 
functionaries related to repressions of the Yanukovych regimes and 
officials associated with the crimes of the communist regime.
Some political actors, most importantly Yushchenko, have tried to 
adopt the European discourse of acknowledgement of past guilt and 
reconciliation in the process of Ukrainian-Polish reconciliation. These 
efforts, however, have been incomplete and inconsistent, as the ‘poli-
tics of regret’ was accompanied by policies and statements that justi-
fied the need to commemorate and glorify heroes of the national lib-
eration struggle and to forgive their sins. The most difficult task has 
been to deal with the guilt for the crimes of the communist period. For 
Kravchuk and Yushchenko, the responsibility for the crimes lies entirely 
with Moscow. The evidence collected by the dissident movement, the 
UINM, academia and civil society about the crimes of the communist 
regime has been used to delegitimize the communist regime. However, 
it has not led to national dialogue, and dialogue with Russia remains 
even more distant than when Yushchenko first attempted to start such 
conversations. The adoption of memory and history laws in 2015 hap-
pened after a gradual process of interregional and interstate radicaliza-
tion. The legislation of history and memory, privileging some historical 
narratives and memories and delegitimizing others, while simplifying, 
hardening and fixing historical interpretations, will make the process of 
dialogue and reconciliation all the more complicated and lengthy.
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